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We analyze the short- and long-run implications of third-degree price discrimination in input
markets. In contrast to the extant literature, which typically assumes that the supplier is an
unconstrained monopolist, in our model input prices are constrained by the threat of demand-
side substitution. This modication has profound implications. In our model, the more e¢ cient
and thus ultimately larger buyer receives a discount, while in the extant literature more e¢ cient
downstream rms pay higher input prices. A ban on price discrimination thus benets smaller
but hurts more e¢ cient, larger rms. It also sties incentives to invest and innovate. With
linear demand, a ban on price discrimination benets consumers in the short run but reduces
consumer surplus in the long run, which is once again the opposite to what is found without the
threat of demand-side substitution.
1 Introduction
According to the extant theory on price discrimination in input markets, more e¢ cient rms
should pay a higher price. Consequently, more e¢ cient rms and not their less e¢ cient, smaller
competitors should lobby for a ban on price discrimination. This implication follows from the
common assumption of a monopolistic supplier, which optimally charges more e¢ cient, larger
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rms a higher wholesale price.1
More e¢ cient rms should, however, also have more attractive alternative options. We show
that the presence of a viable threat of demand-side substitution reverses the results from the
existing literature. More e¢ cient rms now receive a discount compared to their less e¢ cient
rivals. A ban on price discrimination would thus only be welcomed by less e¢ cient, smaller
rms.
We also show that a ban on price discrimination may benet consumers in the short run,
however in the long run it tends to reduce consumer surplus and welfare through stiing rms
incentives to invest and innovate. Intuitively, though this represents only one of the identied
mechanisms, under price discrimination a rm that grows through becoming more e¢ cient will
additionally benet from the subsequently obtained larger discount. For the case of linear
demand and without demand-side substitution, the extant literature has obtained instead that
a ban on price discrimination increases investment incentives as it then becomes harder for the
supplier to hold up downstream rms.
Our model and results accord well with the objectives that are typically pursued when passing
bans on price discrimination, such as the famous Robinson-Patman Amendments to Section 2
of the Clayton Act, namely to protect smaller or otherwise weaker competitors.2 Our ndings
also support the common belief that by protecting weak competitors, the imposition of uniform
pricing tends to reduce e¢ ciency in the long run.
The case where a monopolistic supplier faces no threat of substitution may be relevant in
industries where, given their choice of technology, intermediate rms become highly locked into
a relationship with a particular supplier. Likewise, it may be applicable to natural monopolies.
Note, however, that an unconstrained monopoly position is not a necessary prerequisite for a
rm to fall under the relevant antitrust provisions that prohibit or restrict price discrimination.
All that is needed is that the respective supplier is to a su¢ cient extent shielded from e¤ective
competition. Furthermore, mandatory provisions in regulated industries, in particular in net-
1Cf. DeGraba (1990) and Yoshida (2000), or Haucap and Wey (2004) for an application to wages. As in these
papers, our focus is on size di¤erences arising from cost di¤erences. Raskovich (2003) and Inderst (2005) also
show that size can be a disadvantage, unless buyers strategically adopt di¤erent purchasing strategies.
2As Wright Patman, the Texas Democrat who was the main force behind the bill that took is name, wrote
(Patman, 1938, p. 3): The expressed purpose of the Act is to protect the independent merchant, the public
whom he serves, and the manufacturer from whom he buys, from exploitation by unfair competitors.
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work industries, also apply to rms that do not enjoy (or do no longer enjoy) a monopolistic
position.3
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic model.4 Section 3
analyzes the case where intermediate rms operate in separate markets. The case of geographic
market segmentation is particularly relevant for Europe. European law tightly restricts the
scope for price discrimination along the boundaries of the European Unions member states.5
In Section 4 we introduce competition between intermediate rms, which creates the possibil-
ity for secondary line injury.6 Secondary line injury occurs when price discrimination practices
put some of a dominant rms customers at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other cus-
tomers. One example, to which we will return later in more detail, is that of retailing. The
rise of powerful, cross-border big boxretailers such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour, or Tesco has lead
to concerns that their purchasing power distorts competition and unduly harms smaller rivals.
Moreover, as shown by Dukes et al. (2006), though public prosecution under the Robinson-
Patman Act has become rare in the US, each year there are still approximately 14 private party
suits pursued. While we show that restrictions on price discrimination in wholesale markets
could indeed benet consumers in the short run, in the long run the reverse picture emerges
as it dampens downstream rmsincentives to invest. The paper closes in Section 5 with some
concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
3For instance, the EUs new regulatory framework for electronic communications lists nondiscrimination re-
quirements as one of the key options for National Regulatory Authorities (cf. Valletti, 2003). Comparable
provisions can be found in the US Telecommunications Act of 1996.
4Here, we rely on a modelling approach from Katz (1987), who showed that retail chains should obtain lower
wholesale prices as their larger overall volume implies a (more) credible option of backward integration.
5To sanction geographic price discrimination, Community courts have relied both on a wider interpretation of
Article 82(c) and, in particular, on prohibiting restrictions on parallel trade (on the grounds of Article 81), which
are often a prerequisite to sustain meaningful price di¤erentials in input markets.
6Primary line injury arises if a particular business practice puts a suppliers own competitors at a disadvantage.
This is particularly relevant if the potential o¤ender is a vertically integrated rm (as in Biglaiser and DeGraba,
2001).
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2 The Model
The basic set-up follows much of the literature on price discrimination in an intermediate goods
industry. We consider a single supplier that provides an input to the intermediate industry.
Firms in the intermediate industry use the input to produce a homogeneous nal good. Firms
transform one unit of the input into one unit of the output.7 The supplier produces at constant
marginal cost, which we take to be zero to simplify our expressions. Also, without much loss
in generality we restrict attention to two downstream rms, i = 1; 2. We denote rm is own
constant marginal cost of production by ki  0.
Our analysis distinguishes between the following two cases. In the rst case, the two down-
stream rms serve independent markets. For most of our analysis we assume that both markets
are symmetric and thus characterized by the same inverse demand function P (q). In the sec-
ond case that we analyze, both rms are active in the same market, o¤er homogeneous goods,
and compete in quantities. In both cases, we assume that P (q) is strictly decreasing and twice
continuously di¤erentiable where P (q) > 0. Moreover, we employ the standard assumption that
P 0 < minf0; qP 00g where P > 0.8
In specifying next the contractual game, we follow again closely the extant literature. The
supplier can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to downstream rms.9 Under price discrimination,
the supplier thus o¤ers each rm a possibly di¤erent wholesale price wi, while under uniform
pricing the same price wi = w applies to both rms. Consequently, upon accepting the suppliers
o¤er, a rms total marginal cost equals ci := wi+ ki. Our restriction to linear contracts, which
we discuss in detail after presenting our rst results, is shared with much of the literature on
third-degree price discrimination.
Our main deviation from most of the literature is that despite having the ability to make
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, the supplier is no longer an unconstrained monopolist. Here, we follow
7This specication is not important for our results, though it ts our leading example of the retail industry.
8See, for instance, Vives (1999). This assumption ensures that under Cournot competition the rms
maximization problem is strictly concave. If the two rms serve independent markets, the weaker condition
2P 0 < minf0; qP 00g would su¢ ce.
9That the supplier can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is not as restrictive as it seems. It is well-known that
under the so-called outside-option principlethe outcome from bilateral Nash bargaining is pinned down by the
binding outside option of one party if this is su¢ ciently attractive. In our case, this would be the option of each
intermediary rm to change supplier.
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Katz (1987) and suppose that instead of ceasing operations when rejecting the suppliers o¤er,
a downstream rm can turn to an alternative source of supply. As in Katz (1987), this comes
at costs F > 0 and allows the respective rm to obtain the input at constant marginal costsbw  0.10 Below we also discuss the possibility that the alternative input is only an imperfect
substitute.
In Katz (1987) the buyersalternative is that of backwards integration, which is viable only
for the largest buyer. In contrast, we focus our analysis on the case where the threat of demand-
side substitution is credible for all rms. An alternative interpretation could be that the costs
F are incurred to adopt another technology, which then allows to purchase a di¤erent input
at the (competitive) price of bw. Below we will also discuss the possibility that after rejecting
the suppliers o¤er, a buyer can reduce bw by expending more resources, e.g., by searching more
intensively for a low-price alternative or, in the case of backwards integration, by making higher
investments.11 There, we will also discuss the applicability of our model to di¤erent industries.
The nal part of our model is an initial investment stage. Following DeGraba (1990), each
downstream rm can reduce its own marginal cost ki.12 Precisely, a rm reduces its initial cost
ki > 0 by k after incurring the expenditure e(k). We suppose that e is strictly increasing and
continuously di¤erentiable with e0(0) = 0 and e0(k)!1 as k ! ki, which allows us to focus
on interior solutions. The chosen investment levels and, consequently, the respective values of
ki are common knowledge. Our equilibrium concept is that of subgame perfection. We restrict
attention to equilibria in pure strategies.
3 Separate Markets
The Short Run
In this Section we stipulate that two monopolists serve two segmented markets. In the short
10A set-up where such bypass is possible only after incurring a xed cost is also used in La¤ont and Tirole
(1990). There, the alternative option is only attractive to one type of customers, while in our model it constrains
the suppliers o¤er to all downstream rms.
11We abstract from the possibility that a rm may strategically procure from multiple suppliers so as to reduce
F in case one contract has to be replaced. Such considerations are part of the analysis in Biglaiser and Vettas
(2005).
12See Choi (1995) for a similar model in the context of government tari¤s in international trade.
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run we take rmsown marginal costs ki as given. The long run, where ki is endogenous, is
analyzed subsequently.
Firm i optimally chooses the unique quantity q(ci) := argmaxq fq [P (q)  ci]g and realizes
the prots (ci) := q(ci) [P (q(ci))  ci] ; where both q and  are strictly decreasing in ci as long
as P (0) > ci. In case the suppliers prots q(ci)wi are strictly quasiconcave where q > 0, an
unconstrained monopolist would optimally choose the discriminatory prices
wUCi := argmaxwi
fq(ci)wig : (1)
Turning to the case of a constrained supplier, note rst that for rm i the value of the alternative
supply option equals
Ai := (bci)  F; (2)
where bci := bw + ki denotes the respective marginal cost. Consequently, the suppliers o¤er to
rm i must satisfy the respective participation constraint
(ci)  Ai : (3)
In what follows, we rst focus on the case where Ai is su¢ ciently attractive such that for
each rm i the respective condition (3) constrains the suppliers optimal choice of wi. This is
in turn the case if the monopolistic input price wUCi is high enough, i.e., if (ci) < 
A
i holds for
ci = ki+w
UC
i . As is straightforward to show, this is in turn always the case if both F and bw are
not too large. In what follows, we assume that this is the case. We obtain the following result
(all proofs not found in the text are presented in the Appendix).
Proposition 1. In the case with separate markets and price discrimination, wholesale prices
wi are strictly increasing in own marginal costs ki.
To see why in our model a supplier that is constrained by the threat of demand-side substi-
tution grants the more e¢ cient rm a discount, note rst that a reduction of ki increases both
the rms prots under the suppliers o¤er, (ci); and the value under its alternative supply
option, Ai = (bci)  F . As we argue next, however, the e¤ect on Ai is strictly larger, implying
that a reduction in ki tightens the participation constraint (3). This in turn makes it necessary
to reduce wi.
It thus remains to argue why a reduction in ki has a larger e¤ect on the o¤-equilibrium
prots Ai than on the on-equilibrium prots (ci). This results from the following two
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observations. First, note that a rms prots (c) are strictly convex in c. Intuitively, if c is
already low and the rm thus produces a higher quantity, then it benets more from a further
reduction. The second observation is that for given ki, the rms total marginal costs are indeed
lower under the outside option, i.e., ci > bci. Recall that this follows from the fact that from
F > 0 the supplier can charge a an additional margin above bw such that wi > bw.13
It should also be noted that the argument for why there is a size discount in our model
is di¤erent from that in Katz (1987). As discussed previously, in Katz (1987) only the large
retail chain, which operates in several independent markets, has a credible option of backwards
integration. Expressed with our notation, the participation constraint of a (monopolistic) retailer
operating in, say, two independent markets would in analogy to (3) become 2(ci)  2(bci) F .
Size makes the outside option of integrating backwards more attractive as the xed costs F can
simply be spread over a larger volume.14
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that rms with a larger purchasing volume
obtain discounts. The opposite is found in case the supplier can set the unconstrained optimal
price wi = wUCi . There, a more e¢ cient, larger rm represents for the supplier the less elastic
(i.e., stronger) market.15 (Cf. the analysis below, where we also allow for asymmetric sizes of
downstream markets.)
With F = 0 there would be no scope for price discrimination. Both rms would then obtain
the same input price wi = bw. If instead F > 0 holds, then the higher is F the more scope there
is for the supplier not only to raise both wholesale prices but also to price discriminate between
the two downstream rms, provided they di¤er in e¢ ciency and thus ultimately in size.
Corollary 1. The higher is F , the higher are both wholesale prices wi as well as the di¤erence
wj   wi > 0 when rm i is more e¢ cient with ki < kj .
Turning next to the case where price discrimination is banned, we rst assume that the
suppliers o¤er w is acceptable to both rms. The prevailing uniform wholesale price is then
pinned down by the binding participation constraint of the more e¢ cient rm (cf. Proposition
13Note that the argument does not hinge on the assumption that inputs from both sources are homogeneous. If
instead  6= 1 units of the alternative input were required to produce one unit of the output, then the respective
marginon which the preceding argument is based would now be equal to wi   bw > 0.
14 Inderst (2007) also deals with the case where rms can grow through acquisitions in independent markets.
15Strictly speaking, the analysis in, for instance, DeGraba (1990) only establishes this for the case with linear
demand.
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1). From this observation we have the following result.
Proposition 2. If in the case of separate markets the suppliers uniform o¤er w is still accept-
able to both rms and if ki < kj , then w is equal to the discriminatory price wi of the more
e¢ cient rm i and thus strictly lower than wj.
Proposition 2 can again be contrasted with the predictions from the case where the supplier is
an unconstrained monopolist. In that case, if the supplier continues to serve both markets then
the resulting uniform wholesale price lies strictly between the higher discriminatory price for the
more e¢ cient rm and the lower discriminatory price for the less e¢ cient rm. In the alternative
case where the supplier dropped a market, it would only sell to the more e¢ cient, larger rm.
In contrast, our model would predict the opposite: Following a ban on price discrimination, the
more e¢ cient and larger buyer, which previously enjoyed a discount, may switch suppliers.
In the case of a switch by the more e¢ cient rm, the supplier would continue to set the
higher discriminatory price for the less e¢ cient rm. The more e¢ cient rm would instead
procure from the alternative source of supply at a cost bw that is strictly below the previous
discriminatory wholesale price. (Recall that from F > 0 the initial supplier can demand an
additional margin wi  bw > 0.) This implies, however, that even if a ban on price discrimination
causes the more e¢ cient rm to switch, then consumer surplus is still higher. Together with
Proposition 2 we have thus arrived at the following result.
Corollary 2. In the case of separate markets and with k1 6= k2, a ban on price discrimination
strictly increases consumer surplus. This is independent of whether the supplier still serves both
rms or whether the more e¢ cient and larger rm then procures from the alternative source of
supply.
In terms of welfare, which we take to be total surplus, there is, however, a di¤erence between
the two cases captured in Corollary 2. If the supplier still serves both rms under uniform
pricing, then it is straightforward that a ban on price discrimination also raises welfare. In
contrast, if the more e¢ cient buyer switches after the imposition of uniform pricing, then it has
to spend F > 0 and the implications for welfare are generally ambiguous.
The Long Run
At the rst stage of our model, intermediate rms can invest in a reduction of own marginal
costs ki. As a benchmark, suppose rst that input prices wi were exogenously xed. (For
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instance, for w1 = w2 it could be the price prevailing in a perfectly competitive upstream
market.) In this case, rm i would optimally choose the reduction k in ki = ki  k to trade
o¤ the resulting marginal increase in prots,  0(ci) > 0 where ci = ki + wi, with marginal
investment costs, e0(k). Note that throughout this Section we assume that the expenditure
function e(k) is su¢ ciently convex so as to ensure that rmsoptimal investment levels are
uniquely determined.
If wi is, instead, strategically chosen by the supplier and thus varies with ki (cf. Proposition
1), rm is marginal benet from reducing ki is strictly higher. This follows as by Proposition
1 a reduction in ki also leads to a lower input price wi. To see this again formally, observe that
the marginal benet from a reduction of ki equals
 d(ci)
dki
=  0(ci)

1 +
dwi
dki

; (4)
where dwi=dki > 0.
We next contrast rms incentives under price discrimination, as given by (4), with those
under uniform pricing. If ki  kj holds, then the marginal benet from further decreasing
ki is not a¤ected by the imposition of uniform pricing. This results immediately from our
previous observation that the uniform wholesale price is equal to the discriminatory price of
the more e¢ cient rm. In contrast, for ki > kj the marginal incentives for rm i to reduce ki
are strictly lower under uniform pricing. A marginal reduction in ki does then not a¤ect the
uniform wholesale price. More formally, for the ex-post less e¢ cient rm we have dwi=dki = 0
(cf. instead (4) if ki  kj).
The preceding discussion also implies that even if rms are ex-ante symmetric with k1 = k2,
then under uniform pricing they will always have di¤erent ex-post e¢ ciencies. Under uniform
pricing the ex-post less e¢ cient rm free-rides on the higher investment made by the more
e¢ cient rm.16
Proposition 3. With separate markets and if both rms are still served under uniform pricing,
downstream rms invest less (one always strictly so) if there is a ban on price discrimination in
the wholesale market. Also, even if rms are initially symmetric, in the long run under uniform
pricing one rm will always be more e¢ cient than the other.
16 It is then also immediate that for k1 = k2 the ex-post less e¢ cient rm strictly benets from the imposition
of uniform pricing. While having lower ex-post prots than the more e¢ cient rm, its ex-ante prots (net of
investment) are higher.
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If rms are initially symmetric with k1 = k2, then the assumption that the supplier serves
both rms also under uniform pricing is without loss of generality. To see this, suppose there
was an equilibrium with ki > kj where the supplier would drop market j. But then the less
e¢ cient rm i will be charged the discriminatory price. In anticipation of this, rm i should
have chosen the same investment level as under price discrimination, in which case, however,
rm j would want to free-ride on i such that ki < kj .17 With ex-ante symmetry, where we
can thus also presume that both rms are always served, the long-run implications of a ban on
price discrimination follow then immediately from Proposition 3. As the ex-post more e¢ cient
rm chooses the same investment under both discriminatory and uniform pricing, the prevailing
wholesale prices are the same. As the other rm, however, invests strictly less under uniform
pricing, output and consequently consumer surplus are strictly lower.
Corollary 3. In the case with separate markets, if downstream rms are initially equally
e¢ cient and can invest in a reduction of own marginal costs, then a ban on price discrimination
strictly reduces consumer surplus.
To conclude this Section, it is again instructive to compare our results with those obtained if
the supplier was an unconstrained monopolist. There, downstream rms face a hold-up problem,
which is mitigated under uniform pricing. In stark contrast to Corollary 3, a ban on price
discrimination thus induces rms to invest more.18 Without further restrictions on demand
functions and investment costs, unambiguous implications for welfare can, however, not be
obtained. This is di¤erent in the case of linear demand, which we analyze next.
Illustration: The Case of Linear Demand
For P (q) = 1 q we obtain prots (ci) =
 
1 ci
2
2
. Substitution into the binding participation
constraint (3) yields the optimal discriminatory prices
wi = 1  ki  
p
(1  ki   bw)2   4F : (5)
Inspection of (5) conrms that wi > bw is strictly increasing in ki, as well as in F and bw. As is also
17 In equilibrium, the rm that will end up free-riding on the ex-post more e¢ cient rm thus faces the constraint
that after both investments are made the supplier does not want to drop the more e¢ cient rm.
18 Incidentally, a recent paper by Hermalin and Katz (2006) nds a result with a similar avor to our (and
di¤erent from established literature): that improving the sellers information, which is akin to creating more
scope for price discrimination, can increase investment incentives by reducing a buyers exposure to hold-up.
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straightforward to show, we obtain for the suppliers unconstrained optimum the discriminatory
wholesale prices wUCi = (1   ki)=2. Comparing wi from (5) with wUCi while observing that
the suppliers prots are strictly concave in the wholesale price, we also obtain explicitly the
condition for when the supplier is indeed constrained, which is the case if
F < F i :=

1  ki   bw
2
2
 

1  ki
4
2
: (6)
For the case with linear demand the preceding observations also allow us to fully characterize
the equilibrium outcome for all values of F . For this purpose it is helpful to denote for the
moment the equilibrium o¤ers of a constrained supplier by wCi . For the following Proposition
4 as well as for Proposition 5 we restrict consideration to the case where the supplier serves all
markets.
Proposition 4. For the case with linear demand, separate markets, as well as ki < kj, we can
distinguish between the following cases as F changes: If F < F j then wi = wCi and wj = w
C
j ;
if F j  F < Fi then wi = wC and wj = wUCj ; and if F  Fi then wi = wUCi and wj = wUCj :
Moreover, there exists a threshold F j < F 0 < F i such that wi < wj holds for F < F 0 and
wi > wj holds for F > F 0.
In words, as rms become increasingly locked-in to a given supplier, we gradually move from
discounts for more e¢ cient, larger buyers to discounts for less e¢ cient, smaller buyers
For the long-run analysis with linear demand, we follow DeGraba (1990) and take a quadratic
investment cost function e(k) = (k)2=2, where without a¤ecting results we set now  = 1.19
We further restrict the analysis to the case where rms are initially symmetric with ki = k. With
linear demand and quadratic investment cost, we can use the resulting explicit characterization
of investment levels to obtain unambiguous results also for a comparison of welfare (cf. the proof
of Proposition 5 for the respective values). We can show that, rst, at least for low F welfare is
strictly concave in a rms level of e¢ ciency ki and that, second, even under price discrimination
the choice of k lies strictly below the value that maximizes welfare.
Proposition 5. Take the case with linear demand, quadratic investment costs, and separate
markets where initially ki = k. Then for low F both consumer surplus and welfare are strictly
19Admittedly, as the derivative remains bounded for k ! ki, this specication does not satisfy one of the
stipulated requirements for the general case. In what follows, we will, however, impose su¢ cient conditions to
ensure that the equilibrium is still interior (cf. the proof of Proposition 5).
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lower in the long run if price discrimination is banned in the wholesale market.
Threat of Demand-Side Substitution
As we discussed in the case with linear demand, through varying F we can bridge the
case with a viable threat of demand-side substitution for both buyers with that where the
supplier remains unconstrained. Empirically, the di¤erent predictions on whether large buyers
pay higher or lower unit purchasing prices may then reveal the potency of the threat of demand-
side substitution or, more generally, of buyer power. Though this may not always represent the
most important lever of buyer power, the use of xed costs of substitution as in Katz (1987)
represents a parsimonious way to generate buyer power.20
In retailing, backward integration could be seen akin to the introduction of private labels. If
downstream rms are themselves manufacturers, the costs F may have to be incurred to make
the use a di¤erent inputs feasible. In this case the necessary adjustment costs could also arise
fully or partially at the newly chosen supplier.21 Yet another application of our model could
be to the debate on net neutralityas a form of imposed uniform pricing on providers of last
mileInternet access services (cf. Hermalin and Katz, 2007). Once there is price discrimination
by content or by the identity of an accessed homepage, prices should also depend on the ability
of content providers to sidestep certain networks. The recent participation of Google in the
FCCs 700 MHz spectrum auction may represent such a threat of backward integration.
After bypassing the initial supplier, e.g., through backward integration, a rm may be able
to invest in making the new supply option more attractive. Suppose thus for the moment that
after rejecting the suppliers o¤er, rm i can reduce the marginal cost under the alternative
supply option from w > 0 to bwi := w   w by spending h(w): For instance, this could be
achieved through higher investment in case of backward integration. We can show that this
modication further increases the di¤erential in input prices between more and less e¢ cient
rms, while otherwise not a¤ecting our results qualitatively. Formally, in this case the outside
option of rm i has the value
Ai = maxbwi [(ki + bwi)  h(w   bwi)]  F;
20For a discussion of the various levers of buyer power see, for instance, Inderst and Mazzarotto (2006).
21Alternative suppliers would then choose bw competitively such that qi(bc) bw = F , where qi represents the
purchased quantity and where we have set their own marginal cost to zero.
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where from strict convexity of  the optimal choice of bwi is strictly decreasing in ki. As dAi =dki =bqi, where bqi denotes the quantity chosen under the outside option, and as bqi is higher the lower
is bci = ki + bwi, a lower value of ki has then both a positive direct e¤ect on Ai as well as a
positive indirect e¤ect through the reduction of bwi.22
To see more precisely how the latter e¤ect further widens the gap in purchasing terms, denote
the choice of the less e¢ cient rm j by bwj = bw. As marginal costs under the alternative option
become endogenous, implying that the more e¢ cient and thus larger rm chooses bwi < bw, the
di¤erence Ai   Aj > 0 widens, implying a larger di¤erence in wholesale prices wj   wi > 0.
Asymmetric Markets
From the suppliers perspective the two markets di¤er as the respective downstream rms
have di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency. The more e¢ cient and thus ultimately larger buyer can com-
mand a lower wholesale price as his outside option becomes relatively more attractive. Intu-
itively, we would expect that this result extends to the case where di¤erences in rmsderived
demand for the input arise directly from di¤erences in nal demand.
To explore this formally, we follow Cowan (2007) and suppose that in market i the utility
of a representative consumer is given by U(qi   ai), where ai  0 represents a shift factor and
where qi   ai  0. From utility maximization we obtain for indirect demand Pi = P (qi   ai),
where P = U 0. Note that as in Cowan (2007) we can express direct demand by a function
qi(p) = ai + q(p). With q(p) =  bp we have the special case of linear demand.
Observe next that holding ci constant, for market i and quantity qi we have that @i=@ai =
P (qi)   ci. The benet from a marginal increase in the size of the retail market is thus higher
the higher is the rms own margin, P (qi)   ci. From wi > bw, which holds by F > 0, it is
thus once again intuitive that the benet from an increase in ai is larger o¤-equilibriumthan
on-equilibrium. The participation constraint of a rm serving a larger market is thus tighter,
implying a strictly lower wholesale price.23 For the following proposition we specify that rms
di¤er only in ai but have the same level of e¢ ciency.
22Here we assume that h(w) is smooth and su¢ ciently convex so as to obtain an interior solution and to apply
the envelope theorem.
23Recall that we know from Katz (1987) that a similar result obtains if the rm (retailer) serves a larger
number of otherwise identical, separate markets. As noted above, in this case the size discount is obtained more
immediately from the fact that F can be spread over a larger volume.
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Proposition 6. If demand in market i is obtained from a representative consumer with utility
U(qi   ai) and if ai > aj, then under price discrimination a supplier constrained by the threat
of demand-side substitution will set wi < wj, thereby again granting the larger buyer a discount.
For comparison, with an unconstrained supplier we obtain for the optimal wholesale prices
wUCi =  qi(2P 0i + qiP 00i ): (7)
Though it is generally not possible to sign how wUCi changes with ai, for the case with linear
demand and thus P 0 =  b < 0 as well as P 00i = 0, dwUCi =dai > 0 follows immediately from (7).
Discussion of Linear Contracts
In our analysis we assumed that bilateral contracts stipulate a constant unit price. We
discuss this assumption in two parts. We rst defend the chosen assumption of linear contracts
on the grounds of possible realism. We then provide a short discussion of the outcome with
more general contracts.
The choice of linear contracts ensures, albeit admittedly in a relatively stark and simple way,
that discounts to more e¢ cient rms are, at least to some extent, passed on into lower retail
prices. This assumption is shared with, for instance, Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida
(2000). Supply contracts are clearly often, though not always, more complex than what we
presume to be the case in our model. One case is that of grocery retailing, where supply contracts
often cover a range of di¤erent items, including quantity discounts, year-end rebates, slotting
fees, promotional allowances, etc.24 However, it seems that even there discounts are often given
at the margin, where they matter for retail prices. In fact, a detailed econometric analysis
of grocery supply contracts by the UKs Competition Commission revealed that discounts are
given more than proportionally in terms of the variablecontractual components.25
In this respect, the UKs grocery market may, however, be to some extent extreme. To our
knowledge, contractual relationships are often very uid, with major retailers and suppliers
24Our own observations suggest, however, that at least in the UK grocery industry linear pricing is prevalent
in the cases of fresh produce, milk, or bakery products. On the theoretical side, Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) and
Milliou et al. (2005) also o¤er some support for the use of simple, linear contracts.
25The Commission found that once it excluded the xed parts of contracts, the relative discounts that larger
grocers enjoyed were even higher (Competition Commission, 2007, Working Paper on Supplier Pricing). Variable
discounts include wholesale price reductions through funded promotions or (all-unit) retroactive rebates.
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being in constant (re-)negotiations. In contrast, in Germany or France supply contracts seem
to be more completeand negotiated long in advance. If this implies that discounts are given
less at the margin, the lower pass-through to nal consumers would also reduce the identied
short-run benets of a ban on price discrimination.
We conclude with a brief discussion of the issues that arise if the supplier can o¤er two-
part tari¤s Ti(qi) = ti + wiqi. One complication is here that also the benchmark case with an
unconstrained, monopolistic supplier and observable contracts has hitherto not been analyzed.
Our following discussion will rely on material from Inderst and Sha¤er (2008).
Under price discrimination the participation constraint of rm i is given by (ci)  ti  Ai .
As the supplier can extract the residual surplus (above Ai ) from either rm, it optimally chooses
wi = 0 next to ti = (ci)   Ai . Writing these out more explicitly, we have ti = F + (ki)  
(ki + bw):Imagine rm i is the more e¢ cient rm ex-post (ki < kj). If bw = 0, then ti = tj = F .
Otherwise, as (c) is strictly convex in c, the xed transfer is larger than F and ti > tj :
Under uniform pricing the supplier is constrained to o¤er a single contract (t; w) to both
rms. If k1 = k2, then both participation constraints always bind and the solution is simply
the (identical) contract under price discrimination. Suppose thus k1 6= k2. In what follows we
consider that k1 < k2. We can show that the outside option binds only for the less e¢ cient
rm and that the supplier sets a wholesale price greater than zero. Hence, consumer surplus
and welfare are unambiguously lower under uniform pricing. This result, however, depends on
having normalized to zero the suppliers marginal costs. If they were positive and larger thanbw, the results could be reversed.
The long-run analysis is somewhat involved and beyond the scope of this paper. In the case
of linear demand, however, we could conrm that with both linear and two-part tari¤ contracts
consumer surplus is strictly higher under price discrimination.
4 Competition
The Short Run
We denote Cournot quantities if rms have known total marginal costs ci and cj by q(ci; cj)
and the respective prots by (ci; cj). As in DeGraba (1990) and the related literature, we
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assume that wholesale prices are commonly observed.26 If the supplier was an unconstrained
monopolist, he would maximize w1q(c1; c2) + w2q(c2; c1), where again ci = wi + ki. As shown
in DeGraba (1990) for the case of linear demand, the resulting optimal unconstrained wholesale
price wi is strictly increasing in a rms own e¢ ciency ki, while it does not depend on the rivals
e¢ ciency.27 Both results will be di¤erent under the threat of demand-side substitution.
Turning to the case with a constrained supplier, for low F we can again always ensure that
both rmsparticipation constraints bind under the suppliers optimal o¤er:
(ci; cj) = 
A
i := (bci; cj)  F: (8)
Throughout the analysis with competition we restrict consideration to the case where the supplier
nds it optimal to serve both rms also under uniform pricing. With discriminatory pricing, we
have the following result on wholesale prices.
Proposition 7. Suppose for the case with competition that the partial derivatives of equilibrium
prots satisfy 11 > 0 and 12 < 0. Then the unique discriminatory wholesale price wi is strictly
lower for a more e¢ cient rm. Moreover, if some rm i becomes more e¢ cient, then wi strictly
decreases while wj strictly increases.
The joint assumption on the prot function, namely that 11 > 0 and 12 < 0, is commonly
made in the literature. For instance, it is made in the literature on R&D races and strategic
cost reduction (e.g., Katz, 1986). It is satised by most common functional specications for
demand (cf. below the case with linear demand).28 In our model, this assumption allows to
make unambiguous predictions on how a change in a rms marginal cost a¤ects participation
constraints and thereby wholesale prices.
As already argued in the case of separate markets, a reduction in a rms own marginal cost
ki increases both the value of its alternative supply option Ai and the prots from the suppliers
o¤er. To sign the e¤ect on the equilibrium input price wi, we used that the e¤ect on Ai was
stronger, which formally held as monopoly prots (c) are convex and as wi > bw. If the Cournot
26As is shown in the working paper version, with linear contracts the outcome is the same if rivalswholesale
prices are not observable and if we adopt passive beliefs.
27The latter result is specic to linear demand, where two opposing e¤ects that a decrease in kj has on wi just
cancel out: rst, the equilibrium quantity qi falls, which reduces the optimal wi; second, as the optimal wj rises,
this makes it protable for the supplier to shift sales to rm j, calling for a rise in wi.
28See Athey and Schmutzler (2001) for a detailed discussion.
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prots (ci; cj) are still convex in own costs as 11 > 0, then a reduction in ki still makes the
participation constraint of rm i tighter, which in turn forces the supplier to lower wi.
In contrast to the case of separate markets, a reduction of ki now also a¤ects both (cj ; ci)
and Aj for the rival j. If 12 < 0 holds, then the e¤ect on 
A
j is again stronger: As rm i
becomes more e¢ cient, the participation constraint for rm j is relaxed, allowing the supplier
to raise wj . In what follows, we will always invoke the assumption that 11 > 0 and 12 < 0.
If two competing rms purchase inputs from the same supplier, Proposition 7 suggests that
discriminatory input prices amplify the e¤ects arising from e¢ ciency di¤erences through two
channels: rst, through a reduction in the more e¢ cient rms input price and, secondly, through
an increase in the less e¢ cient rms input price.
The interplay between the two wholesale prices, which arises only under competition, ren-
ders the analysis with uniform pricing di¤erent to that in case of independent markets. With
competition, imposing uniform pricing adversely a¤ects the more e¢ cient rm both as its com-
petitors input price decreases relative to its discriminatory price and as its own input price
increases. To see why the uniform wholesale price lies strictly above the discriminatory price
of the more e¢ cient rm, suppose that ki < kj and suppose that the supplier would o¤er both
rms the lower discriminatory price of the more e¢ cient rm, wi. As we know from Proposition
7, however, as its rival becomes now more competitive, the participation constraint of rm i will
be relaxed. This allows the supplier to indeed charge a strictly higher uniform wholesale price
w > wi.
Proposition 8. When rms compete and have di¤erent own marginal costs, then a uniform
wholesale price lies strictly above the discriminatory price of the more e¢ cient rm and strictly
below that of the less e¢ cient rm.
We have the following additional comparative result, which will prove useful for the subse-
quent analysis of the long run.
Corollary 4. A marginal reduction of the more e¢ cient rms marginal cost strictly reduces
the uniform wholesale price w, while a marginal reduction of the less e¢ cient rms marginal
cost strictly increases w.
Both results in Corollary 4 follow intuitively from Proposition 8. In particular, recall that
if rm j is the less e¢ cient rm, then a (marginal) reduction of kj relaxes the participation
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constraint for the more e¢ cient rm i. As the participation constraint for the more e¢ cient
rm i determines the uniform price w, this implies a higher price for both rms.
The Long Run
We consider again rst the case of discriminatory pricing. A marginal reduction in ki in-
creases the prots of rm i by
 d(ci; cj)
dki
=  

@ci
@ki
1(ci; cj) +
@cj
@ki
2(ci; cj)

(9)
= qi

1 +
@wi
@ki

1  @qj
@ci
P 0

  @wj
@ki
@qj
@cj
P 0

;
where we abbreviate qi = q(ci; cj) and qj = q(cj ; ci):
Recall now from (4) that with separate markets the marginal benet from a reduction in
ki equals qi

1 + dwidki

, reecting both the direct e¤ect on the rms own marginal cost and the
reduction in its wholesale price wi. With competition, incentives to reduce own marginal cost
arise now, in addition, through two further channels. First, as a reduction of ki induces a higher
quantity choice qi and as rms compete in strategic substitutes, the rivals optimal response will
be to lower its own quantity qj , which ceteris paribus allows to sustain a higher price.29 Second,
we know from Proposition 7 that a reduction of ki leads to an increase in the rivals wholesale
price wj , which in turn leads to a further reduction of qj and thus again to a higher price in the
downstream market. (Note that in expression (9) the latter e¤ect is accounted for by the last
term, where @wj=@ki < 0 and @qj=@cj < 0.)
Under uniform pricing, where the same price w applies to both rms, we have after a trans-
formation as in (9) that
 d(ci; cj)
dki
= qi

1 +
@w
@ki

1  @qj
@ci
P 0

  @w
@ki
@qj
@cj
P 0

: (10)
We take rst the case where ki  kj . An important di¤erence compared to the incentives under
price discrimination, as given by (9), is that under uniform pricing a lower input price is now
shared with the rms competitor, which reduces incentives. Formally, this is captured by the
last term in (10), where we now have @w=@ki > 0 instead of @wj=@ki < 0 as in (9). In addition,
for given levels of e¢ ciency ki and kj we know that under uniform pricing the quantity that is
sold by the more e¢ cient rm i is strictly lower, which further dampens incentives to reduce
own marginal cost (cf. the multiplier qi in both (9) and (10)).
29 It should, however, be noted that our results do not hinge on the assumption of strategic substitutes.
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Lemma 1. In case of competition, for a more e¢ cient rm the marginal benets from reducing
own cost are strictly lower under uniform pricing than under price discrimination.
It is useful to recall at this point that with separate markets the more e¢ cient rms incentives
were una¤ected by the imposition of uniform pricing. Lemma 1 provides thus a stronger result.30
Recall next that, with separate markets, incentives for the ex-post less e¢ cient rm were
dampened under uniform pricing as a rms own marginal cost did not a¤ect the prevailing
uniform price. (Also recall that we presently restrict attention to the case where both rms are
served.) Incentives are further muted under competition as we know from Corollary 4 that a
reduction in the less e¢ cient rms own marginal cost even increases the uniform wholesale price
under competition.31 In the following Proposition we summarize for the long run the results
that hold for general demand.
Proposition 9. Under competition and with a uniform wholesale price, in the long run rms
always have di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency and thus di¤erent market shares. This holds, in partic-
ular, also for the case where rms are initially symmetric, in which case the ex-post less e¢ cient
rm unambiguously invests less than under price discrimination.
If authorities want to ban price discrimination in the intermediate market so as to create a
level playing eld on the nal market, then by Proposition 9 such a policy may backre in the
long run. One rm ends up with larger incentives to invest as the rm essentially acts as the
price leaderon the wholesale market. The other, ex-post less e¢ cient rm, instead, free rides
if price discrimination is banned.
Linear Demand
With inverse demand P (q) = 1 q we obtain equilibrium quantities q(ci; cj) = (1 2ci+cj)=3
and prots (ci; cj) = (1  2ci + cj)2 =9. From maximizing w1q1+w2q2, where qi = q(ci; cj), we
then immediately obtain that the optimal discriminatory prices of an unconstrained supplier are
identical to those derived in case of separate markets: wUCi = (1  ki)=2. Likewise, the optimal
30Despite this observation, Lemma 1 does not imply that in equilibrium the ex-post more e¢ cient rm always
invests less under uniform pricing. This follows as its rival could in equilibrium end up with such high marginal
costs that despite uniform pricing the more e¢ cient rm realizes higher total output.
31We make here use of the common assumption that an increase in w reduces both rms prots (see, for
instance, Vives 1999, p. 105).
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uniform price is identical to that with separate markets and thus again equal to the average of
the two discriminatory prices.
Note next that with linear demand prots  satisfy the two requirements invoked in Propo-
sition 7: 11 = 8=9 > 0 and 12 =  4=9 < 0. While with asymmetric rms we do not obtain an
explicit characterization of equilibrium prices, it is instructive to observe that with symmetry
and thus ki = k we obtain wi = bw+ 94F=(1  k   bw). This is strictly increasing in bw, F , and k.
Furthermore, in case of uniform pricing and asymmetric rms, ki < kj , we can explicitly
characterize the equilibrium price w = bw + 94F=(1   2ki + kj   bw). This is indeed increasing
in ki but decreasing in kj . Even though, as noted previously, such an explicit characterization
does not exist for the case of discriminatory pricing and ki < kj , we still obtain an unambiguous
comparison of consumer surplus. As shown in the proof of Proposition 10, this is feasible by using
the well-known result that under homogenous Cournot competition total output only depends
on the average marginal costs of competing rms.
Proposition 10. With linear demand and ki 6= kj , consumer surplus in the short run is strictly
higher following a ban of price discrimination. This is independent of whether the supplier still
serves both rms or whether one rm procures from the alternative source of supply.
For a welfare comparison, with competition there is now an additional e¤ect to be considered.
Compared to discriminatory pricing, which benets the more e¢ cient rm, uniform pricing shifts
market share to the less e¢ cient rm. One can show that, at least for very low F , the increase
in consumer surplus dominates if and only if the di¤erence in e¢ ciencies is not too large.
For low F we can also make progress in the long-run analysis. Through di¤erentiating
prots and investment strategies around F = 0, where we can obtain explicit solutions, we can
show analytically that for such very low values of F > 0 both rms strictly invest less under
uniform pricing. (Recall that with general demand we could only show in Proposition 9 that
one rm invests less.) The result is stronger than that obtained with separate markets, where
only one rm invested strictly less while the other rm chose the same investment as under price
discrimination. (Cf. Proposition 3 and recall again that we restrict consideration to the case
where both rms are served under uniform pricing.).
Proposition 11. With linear demand and low F , two ex-ante equally e¢ cient rms both invest
strictly less under uniform pricing than under price discrimination, resulting in lower consumer
surplus and welfare.
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Though Proposition 11 is conned to the case with small F , all numerical results that we
obtained for larger F conrm these results. Figure 1 provides an example, where we choosebw = 0:3, ki = k = 0:4, as well as the investment cost function e(k) = (k)2=2. The left panel
of Figure 1 plots as a function of F the prevailing equilibrium investment levels under price
discrimination (the dotted line) and under uniform pricing (the solid lines). Uniform pricing
raises long-run marginal costs for both rms. The right panel plots the resulting welfare under
price discrimination (the dotted line) and under uniform pricing (the solid line).
.
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Figure 1: Investments (left panel) and welfare (right panel) in the long run
5 Conclusion
A ban on price discrimination in intermediate markets is typically supported by smaller rms
that fear to otherwise obtain worse terms of supply than their bigger rivals. In a setting with
a monopolistic supplier, however, the extant literature obtains the opposite prediction that it
should be larger rms that benet from a ban on price discrimination. We show how this
prediction is reversed once we introduce a viable threat of demand-side substitution, in which
case more e¢ cient, larger rms obtain a discount under price discrimination.
In the short run, where e¢ ciency levels are exogenous, our model predicts that consumers
could be better o¤ if price discrimination was banned. This holds generally if rms operate in
separate markets. With linear demand, with is also typically assumed in the existing literature
(e.g., DeGraba, 1990), the result extends to the case where rms compete in the same market.
In the long run, however, our model predicts that the imposition of uniform pricing may reduce
both consumer surplus and welfare as it sties downstream rmsincentives to improve e¢ ciency.
Again, these implications are opposite to those obtained if the supplier is an unconstrained
monopolist, in which case uniform pricing leads to more downstream investment.
The insight that a ban on price discrimination can have adverse implications in the long
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run is di¤erent from previous results. In particular, it is di¤erent to the drawback of price
uniformity that was emphasized in Katz (1987). There, it is shown that price discrimination
can be benecial when it allows to avoid ine¢ cient backward integration by a larger buyer.
We also found that, once investment incentives are taken into account, a ban on price dis-
crimination in the intermediate goods market can even amplify di¤erences in rms long-run
competitiveness. Under uniform pricing it can be better for a small rm to have the bigger rival
invest and to then sit on its shoulders (i.e., to exploit its lower input price). This nding points
to possible unintended consequences of imposing a ban on price discrimination. While such a
ban might be introduced by policy makers to create a level playing eld, it could actually end
up creating or amplifying di¤erences in competitiveness and size in the long run.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Observe rst that q(ci) is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly decreas-
ing in ci where q > 0. Furthermore, prots are continuously di¤erentiable with 0(ci) =  q(ci).
Recall next that Ai > (ki+w
UC
i ) holds by assumption. Given continuity and strict monotonic-
ity of (ci) and given that the suppliers prots are strictly quasiconcave in wi, there is thus a
unique optimal value bw < wi < wUCi at which the participation constraint (3) for rm i just
binds.32
Next, implicit di¤erentiation of the binding constraint (3) yields
dwi
dki
=
0(bci)  0(ci)
0(ci)
=
q(bci)
q(ci)
  1: (11)
Given wi > bw and as q is strictly decreasing, we have that q(bci) > q(ci). From (11) this nally
yields that dwi=dki > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Implicit di¤erentiation of the binding participation constraint (3) yields
dwi=dF = 1=q(ci) > 0, where we used that 0(ci) =  q(ci). Given that q(ci) < q(cj) for all
ki > kj and F > 0, this also implies that the di¤erence wi   wj > 0 is strictly increasing in F .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. As we assumed that the investment problem is concave, under price
32Strict quasiconcavity of the suppliers prots is a stronger requirement than what is needed. A su¢ cient
requirement is that d [q(ci)wi] =dwi is strictly positive for all wi between zero and the unique value wi that solves
(3) with equality. This condition is, for instance, always satised if we choose F and bw su¢ ciently small.
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discrimination the optimal value of k for rm i satises33
e0(k) = q( bw + ki  k): (12)
Under uniform pricing, we know that for ki  kj the marginal benet from reducing ki is still
q(bci), while for ki > kj it equals q(ci): Given that q(ci) < q(bci), this implies a discontinuity at
ki = kj . In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the ex-post more e¢ cient rm i invests until (12) is
satised, while the ex-post less e¢ cient rms rst-order condition becomes
e0(k) = q(w + kj  k): (13)
Note nally that to ensure existence, it only remains to ensure that the ex-post more e¢ cient
rm i has no incentives to deviate to some value k where ki > kj . If rm i deviates in this
way, its optimal choice k solves the rst-order condition (13) with the only di¤erence that this
time w is equal to the discriminatory price of rm j at kj . A pure-strategy equilibrium thus
exists if and only if this deviation is not strictly protable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. It only remains to make formal the ordering of F j < F i. Using (6) this
holds if, for any i, we have that
dF
dki
=  3(1  ki   bw)  bw
8
< 0:
This holds as we can use that (1   ki)=2 > bw given that, otherwise, the supplier would always
be unconstrained, charging wUCi  bw. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. As under price discrimination each rms prots are equal to the value
of its outside option, the optimal choice of k can be obtained from maximizing (k   k +bw)  e(k). This yields
k = 
PD := 1  k   bw; (14)
which is indeed interior if k < 1  bw.
Under uniform pricing, the optimal choice of the ex-post less e¢ cient rm j maximizes
instead (k  k + wi)  e(k). Substituting from (5) for wi and from (14) for ki = k  PD,
this yields
k = 
U := 2
q
(PD)2   F  PD:
33Firm is program is indeed strictly concave in k if e00(k) >  q0(bci) holds over all relevant values k and
thus, in particular, if it holds for all values bw < bci < bw + ki.
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Under the assumption that the linear demand function is derived from the preferences of
a representative consumer, we have after some further transformations that total welfare 
 is
equal to

 =
4  4(k  k) 
q
(1  k +k   bw)2   4F
8
q
(1  k +k   bw)2   4F   2k
2
and thus has the derivative
d

dk
=
(2k + 2(1  k   bw) + bw)(k + 1  k   bw)  4F
2
q
(k + 1  k   bw)2   4F  
5k + 1  k   bw
4
:
Note also that 
 is thus surely strictly quasiconcave in k when F is small. As we can
substitute PD = 1  k   bw, we have after some further transformations that34
d

dk

k=PD
=
q
(PD)2   F + 
PD(2PD + bw)
2
p
(PD)2   F  
3PD
2
> 0: (15)
Hence, under price discrimination the chosen level of cost reduction is still too low from the
perspective of maximizing total welfare. From U < PD together with strict quasiconcavity
of 
 we thus have that welfare is strictly lower under uniform pricing.
We nally show existence of the characterized pure-strategy equilibrium under uniform pric-
ing. From the proof of Proposition 3 we must verify that the ex-post more e¢ cient rm i
could not protably deviate to some value k < U . Substituting the other rms equilibrium
strategy U , we nd that this deviation is not protable if
(PD)2   F > PD
q
(PD)2   2F ;
which is indeed satised for all F > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. For ease of exposition we drop the subscript i. Noting that the reduced
form prots  depend now also on the shifter a, we have in analogy to the proof of Proposition
1 that
dw
da
=  d(w + k)=da  d( bw + k)=da
d(w + k)=dc
:
34Precisely, we can show that (15) is strictly convex in PD in the admissible range (PD)2=2 > F , where
it is rst decreasing and then increasing. Therefore, the entire expression has a minimum, which arises whenp
(PD)2   F = 4(PD)3 F bw 6FPD
3((PD)2 F ) . After substitution, the value that (15) takes at this minimum is
2F2+ bw(PD)3
2((PD)2 F)3=2
> 0.
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Hence, dw=da < 0 holds if d
2
dcda < 0; which from d=dc =  q is satised in case dq=da > 0.
Using strict quasiconcavity of the rms program, this follows from implicit di¤erentiation of
the downstream rms rst-order condition (P   c) + qP 0 = 0. Precisely, from the second-order
condition the sign of dq=da is given by  (P 0 + qP 00), which is indeed strictly positive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We rst prove Proposition 7 under the assumption that in equilibrium
both participation constraints (8) bind. This is subsequently shown to be indeed the case for
su¢ ciently low values of F .
We start by showing that low values of F also guarantee that the equation system has a
unique solution. For this we turn rst to existence. The binding participation constraint for
i gives us wi as a function of cj = wj + kj . If F is su¢ ciently small, then this has a solution
for any cj . (Choosing F < ( bw + ki; bw + kj) is su¢ cient.) By 1 < 0 the solution is unique.
It is also continuous in cj , while for any choice of cj the solution satises wi 2 [ bw; c], where c
solves (c; 0) = 0. Existence of a solution (w1;w2) is then guaranteed by Brouwers xed point
theorem. To establish uniqueness, we show that the Jacobian matrix of the system (8) is positive
semi-denite, which holds if all principal minors are positive. To establish this, note rst that
 1(c1; c2) > 0 and  1(c2; c1) > 0, while the determinant is given by
D = 1(c1; c2)1(c2; c1)  [2(bc1; c2)  2(c1; c2)] [2(bc2; c1)  2(c2; c1)] : (16)
Given that 1(c1; c2)1(c2; c1) is strictly positive and bounded away from zero in the relevant
range wi 2 [ bw; c] and given that ci bci > 0 becomes arbitrarily close to zero as we lower F , using
continuity of prot functions we have that D > 0 holds surely for all su¢ ciently small F > 0.
We show next that a reduction in ki strictly reduces wi and strictly increases wj , where
j 6= i. Totally di¤erentiating (8) and using continuous di¤erentiability, we obtain dwidki =
Di
D and
dwj
dki
=
Dj
D , where we substitute D > 0 from (16) and
Di = [1(bci; cj)  1(ci; cj)]1(cj ; ci)
+ [2(bci; cj)  2(ci; cj)] [2(bcj ; ci)  2(cj ; ci)] ;
Dj = [2(bcj ; ci)  2(cj ; ci)]1(ci; cj)
+ [1(bci; cj)  1(ci; cj)] [2(bci; cj)  2(ci; cj)] :
Using 11 > 0 and 12 < 0, we thus have that Di > 0, implying that dwi=dki > 0, and that
Dj < 0, implying that dwj=dki < 0.
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It remains to show that in equilibrium the participation constraints (8) indeed bind. Note
rst that we assume throughout the paper that the suppliers program to maximize w1q1+w2q2
is strictly quasiconcave. From this we already know that for low F we have for both i and
feasible values of wi that 
qi + wi
dqi
dwi

+ wj
dqj
dwi
> 0: (17)
We show that a (marginal) deviation to, say, a lower value of w1 is not protable. Note that
from (17) it would then be optimal to increase w2 as much as possible, thereby moving along
the participation constraint of i = 2. Consequently, after some rearranging of terms we have
that the reduction of w1 is not protable if
q1 + w1
dq1
dw1

+ w2
dq2
dw1

>  dw2
dw1

q2 + w2
dq2
dw2

+ w1
dq1
dw2

; (18)
where from (17) both terms in rectangular brackets are strictly positive and for small F bounded
away from zero. Hence, it is su¢ cient to show that dw2dw1 becomes arbitrarily close to zero as
F ! 0. Moving along the participation constraint of i = 2, we have
dw2
dw1
=  2(bc2; c1)  2(c2; c1)
1(bc2; c1) ;
where from w2 ! bw for F ! 0 the numerator (but not the denominator) indeed converges to
zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. With a uniform price the participation constraint of rm i becomes
(w + ki; w + kj)  Ai = ( bw + ki; w + kj)  F: (19)
If ki < kj then this is satised for rm j with strict inequality whenever it holds for rm i.
Observe next that a reduction in w relaxes the constraint (19) if
 1(ci; cj) + [2(bci; cj)  2(ci; cj)] > 0; (20)
which holds from 1 < 0, bci < ci, and 12 < 0. We can then use the arguments in the proof
of Proposition 7 to obtain that the unique uniform input price solves (19) with equality for the
more e¢ cient rm i.
To complete the proof, we show by contradiction that for ki < kj it holds that wi < w < wj .
Suppose rst that w  wi < wj , where we use from Proposition 7 that wi < wj holds under
price discrimination. If the participation constraint for rm i was binding under w; then it
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would, however, be slack under discriminatory pricing, which does not hold in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that wi < wj  w. This is, however, also not possible as by construction of
(wi; wj) there are not two prices w0 > wi and w00  wj , including thus prices w0 = w00 = w, such
that the participation constraints of both rms are still satised if we replace wi by w0 and wj
by w00. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4. Implicit di¤erentiation of the binding participation constraint (19) yields
dw
dki
=   1(bci; cj)  1(ci; cj) 1(ci; cj) + [2(bci; cj)  2(ci; cj)] > 0;
where we use that the denominator is strictly positive from (20) in the proof of Proposition 8
and that the numerator is strictly negative by 11 > 0. Further, by 11 > 0 and 12 < 0 we also
have that
dw
dkj
=   2(bci; cj)  2(ci; cj) 1(ci; cj) + [2(bci; cj)  2(ci; cj)] < 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using ki  kj , the marginal e¤ect of a reduction of ki on Ai and thus on
the equilibrium payo¤ of the more e¢ cient rm equals
 1( bw + ki; wj + kj)  2( bw + ki; wj + kj)dwj
dki
(21)
under discriminatory pricing and
 1( bw + ki; w + kj)  2( bw + ki; w + kj)dw
dki
(22)
under uniform pricing. We show that (21) exceeds (22). Given 2 > 0 as well as dwj=dki < 0
and dw=dki > 0 from Proposition 7, this holds surely in case
1( bw + ki; wj + kj)  1( bw + ki; w + kj): (23)
Given wi < w < wj from Proposition 8, (23) then follows as 12 < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. Denote by kPDi and k
U
i the respective equilibrium marginal costs. We also
take as given a symmetric equilibrium under price discrimination such that kPD1 = k
PD
2 = k
PD.35
35While conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium under price discrimination are again straight-
forward, under uniform pricing it must again not be optimal for the ex-post more e¢ cient rm to deviate to an
investment level where the order in terms of e¢ ciency is reversed.
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Suppose now that i is the ex-post less e¢ cient rm. We argue to a contradiction and suppose
that kUi < k
PD, which then also implies that kUj < k
PD. It is the latter implication that will
lead to a contradiction. To obtain this result, it is su¢ cient to show that, holding for rm i
the choices kPD and kUi xed, the marginal benets to reduce kj under price discrimination
are always larger than under uniform pricing at kj = kUi .
36 To show this, we rst derive the
marginal benets from reducing kj , which equal
 1( bw + kj ; wi + kPD)  2( bw + kj ; wi + kPD)dwi
dkj
(24)
under price discrimination and
 1( bw + kj ; w + kUi )  2( bw + kj ; w + kUi ) dwdkj (25)
under uniform pricing. We want to show that (24) exceeds (25) for all ki. Given that dw=dkj > 0
and dwi=dkj < 0, it is su¢ cient to show that 1( bw+ kj ; w+ kUi ) > 1( bw+ kj ; wi + kPD), which
from 12 < 0 holds if w + kUi < wi + k
PD. As by assumption kUi < k
PD, we thus only need
to show that w < wi. To nally see that this holds, recall that by assumption we have that
kj  kUi < kPD. Note also that the discriminatory price for i would be smaller if instead
of kPD rm i chose ki = kUi , in which case we would end up comparing the uniform price
with the less e¢ cient rms discriminatory price, holding each rms marginal cost xed. That
the less e¢ cient rm i pays then a strictly lower price under uniform pricing follows, however
immediately from Proposition 8. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. With price discrimination we can transform the binding participation
constraint (8) to
(wi   bw) [1  2ki + kj   bw   (wi   wj)] = 9
4
F;
from which we obtain after some transformations for the average discriminatory price W :=
(wi + wj)=2 that
2  ki   kj + 2 bw   4W  Ai  Aj = 0; (26)
where
Ai =
q
(1  2ki + kj   3 bw + 2W )2   18F
36 Incidentally, the following argument establishes this also for all kj  kUi . Note that we use again that the
respective programs are strictly quasiconcave.
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and where Aj is dened symmetrically.
With uniform pricing and ki  kj , we have from the participation constraint for rm i that
w = bw + 9F
4(1  2ki + kj   bw) : (27)
Note now that under homogenous Cournot competition total output only depends on the
average of marginal costs. Hence, to compare consumer surplus under the two regimes it is
su¢ cient to show that the average discriminatory price W from (26) exceeds the uniform price
w from (27). To show this, we now evaluate the left-hand side of (26) by substituting for W the
uniform price w. Note that we can then also use from (27) that F = 4(1 2ki+kj  bw)(w  bw)=9.
After this substitution and after some further transformations, the left-hand side of (26), which
is now evaluated atW = w, becomes 24(kj ki)(w  bw). From kj > ki and w > bw this is strictly
positive. As in addition the left-hand side of (26) is strictly decreasing in W , this nally implies
that the true value of W is indeed higher than w.
Let us now turn to the case where the monopolist, under uniform pricing, sells only to
rm i while rm j switches to the outside option. Then wj = bw and wi is the solution to
(wi   bw) [1  2ki + kj   bw   wi] = 94F . The average input price under uniform pricing is w =
( bw+wi)=2, from which we obtain after transformations that F = 8(1 2ki+kj+ bw 2w)(w  bw)=9.
After this substitution, the left-hand side of (26), which is now evaluated at W = w, becomes
16(1 2ki+kj+ bw 2w)(w  bw). From (1 2ki+kj+ bw 2w) > (1 2ki+kj+ bw 2wi) = qi > 0
and w > bw this is again strictly positive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11. In the long run case, we suppose rst that F = 0 such that input
prices are always equal to bw. In this case it is easily established that with quadratic investment
costs e(k) = (k)2=2 there is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium where both rms choose
 := 4(1  k   bw)=(9t).
Setting  = 2, so as to ensure strict concavity of the investment problem in what follows, we
have from (9) that for general F and ki = k the marginal costs of reducing k must be equal to
the marginal benets
4(1  k   bw)2   9F
144(1  k   bw)3[2(1  k   bw)2   9F ] 32(1  k   bw)4 + 36F (1  k   bw)2   81F 2 = k   k:
In the case of uniform pricing, where rm i is ex-post more e¢ cient, the respective marginal
benets (10) are likewise given by
2
9

1  2ki + kj   bw   9F
4(1  2ki + kj   bw)
 
2 +
9F
2(1  2ki + kj   bw)2

= k   k
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for rm i and by
2
9

1 + ki   2kj   bw   9F
4(1  2ki + kj   bw)
 
2  9F
4(1  2ki + kj   bw)2

k   k
for rm j. To compare the investment levels around F = 0, we can implicitly di¤erentiate the
respective rst-order conditions at F = 0, substituting then at F = 0 the identical equilibrium
level . This yields for the symmetric equilibrium under discriminatory pricing
dki
dF

F=0
=   27
28(1  k   bw) ;
where k = k  k: Under uniform pricing, we obtain respectively
dki
dF

F=0
=
 9
14(1  k   bw) ;
dkj
dF

F=0
=
45
28(1  k   bw) :
By 9=14 < 27=28 we thus have that for low F both rms have higher own marginal costs
under uniform pricing than under price discrimination, implying also higher wholesale prices
and thus altogether lower total output and consumer surplus.
It remains to show that also welfare is lower. It is straightforward that welfare is concave in
the two investment levels and that it is maximized at the symmetric choicek = [4(1 k)  bw]=18,
which is strictly higher than  := 4(1   k   bw)=18. By these results, at  the derivative of
welfare with respect to the choice of k for either rm is thus strictly positive. For small F this
immediately implies that welfare is strictly higher under price discrimination. Q.E.D.
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